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The Character Gap: How Good Are We?, by Christian B. Miller. Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xvii + 276. $21.95 (hardcover).
REBECCA STANGL, The University of Virginia
Recent decades have seen important, even groundbreaking, work by
philosophers and psychologists on moral character. In The Character Gap,
Christian B. Miller draws on some of the most interesting of this work
(including his own) to craft an accessible and fascinating presentation
for non-academic readers. But Miller’s book is not merely a summary of
the research on offer. It is a lucid and crisply written argument defending
three claims: (1) that we ought to be good people, (2) that most of us are
neither virtuous nor vicious and so are not yet good people, and (3) that
there are strategies we can employ to become good people. In short, and
in the words of his title, we should bridge the gap between the character
that we have and the character that we ought to have.
Section I of the book defends the claim that we ought to become good
people. To be a good person is, on Miller’s view, to have the virtues and to
lack the vices. And a virtue is a character trait that (1) leads to good actions
that are appropriate to the particular situation, (2) leads to actions performed in a variety of different situations relevant to the particular virtue,
(3) leads to actions that are done for the appropriate reasons or motives,
and (4) leads to a pattern of motivation and action that is stable and reliable
over time. A vice is a character trait with the very same features, with the
crucial difference that it is oriented in a morally negative direction; it thus
leads to a stable pattern of bad actions done from negative motivations.
So why should we want to possess the virtues and lack the vices? Miller
suggests four reasons. First, virtuous lives are admirable and inspiring;
when we consider the life of a Holocaust rescuer such as Leopold Socha,
for example, we are inspired to want to become more like him. Second,
insofar as the virtues lead to good actions, they make the world a better
place. And who doesn’t want to live in a better, rather than a worse, world?
Third, if you believe in God, you should want to become good insofar as
God wants you to become good. And finally, even though a truly virtuous
person doesn’t perform good actions in order to experience positive emotions such as joy and avoid negative emotions such as guilt, experiencing
such positive emotions and avoiding such negative emotions is often the
by-product of a virtuous character. And who doesn’t want more joy and
less guilt?
Alas, if what Miller argues in Section II is correct, most of us are not
yet good people. Miller builds his case for this second claim by devoting a chapter each to recounting the fascinating empirical work done by
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psychologists in four areas of moral life: helping, harming, lying, and
cheating. What this empirical evidence shows, according to Miller, is that
most people are neither virtuous nor vicious. They are not virtuous insofar as they do not reliably help others when they ought, even when the
cost is low. Nor do they refrain from harming, lying, and cheating others
when they ought, even when the goods to be gained are trivial and the
cost of refraining not dire. But neither are they vicious: most of us are
capable of helping others, for example, on the basis of altruistic reasons,
especially when our sense of empathy is activated. Vicious people would
not be moved by such considerations. And even though most of us are
surprisingly willing to harm others, we do so only reluctantly. Vicious
people would harm others with pleasure.
So, if Miller is right, we all have strong reasons to be good and yet most
of us fail to be so. But Miller does not end on a sour note by simply diagnosing our current predicament; rather, in Section III, he aims to soften the
blow by describing various strategies for improving our character. Among
others, he recommends emulating moral role models, carefully selecting
the kinds of situations in which we place ourselves, and getting the word
out about the surprising way seemingly irrelevant features of our environments might derail our attempts to behave rightly and improve our
character. Of particular interest to readers of this journal will be his final
chapter, in which he considers particularly Christian strategies for character improvement. Rituals such as prayer and tithing, the pursuit of moral
ideals within community, and depending on the workings of the Holy
Spirit are all recommended.
Some of Miller’s suggestions for character improvement are of a piece
with what has long been recognized: the suggestion to carefully select
one’s situations so as to avoid behaving badly will sound familiar to those
raised to avoid the near occasions of sin, for example. But others are more
novel: it is only once we know what the bystander effect is that we can
mindfully try to counteract its deleterious effects. Miller does not claim
that any of these strategies are foolproof, and he finds some more likely to
be helpful than others. He holds out hope for more insight into such strategies as philosophical and psychological work on character continues.
But, nonetheless, he ends on the optimistic note that we not only ought,
but also can, become better people than we now are.
This is a beautifully written book, and it will surely accomplish its goals
of introducing the general reader to a surprising, important, and growing
field of research. Of course, and especially given the constraints of writing
with such an audience in mind, it raises as many questions as it answers.
Let me briefly discuss three that it raised for me.
The first concerns Miller’s claim that most of us lack virtue and, in
particular, his claim that most of us lack the virtue of compassion. His
defense of this claim appeals to the many studies showing that we will
often fail to help others, even if the cost is trivial. But, as Miller recognizes,
the virtue of compassion does not require us to help everyone in every
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circumstance. Such an aim would be excessively burdensome and, in any
event, impossible to fulfill. Moreover, Miller accepts a threshold conception of virtue, according to which one can be, for instance, compassionate
full-stop without being perfectly compassionate. Given these two facts,
one might wonder why Miller is so confident that the empirical evidence
shows that most people lack compassion rather than showing that most
people are imperfectly compassionate. Of course, a lot turns on where the
threshold for imperfect compassion lies and this is not a question to which
Miller devotes much attention. But it is at least arguable that the kind of
trivial failures to help demonstrated in many of the relevant studies do
not disqualify one from reaching the threshold of imperfect compassion.
Miller considers a somewhat related objection—that trivial failures to
help do not disqualify us from the possession of virtue—and offers two
responses. His first response is to insist that paradigm cases of compassionate people, such as Mother Teresa, would help even in trivial cases.
That might well be true. But I don’t think it is relevant to my version of
the objection. If virtue is a threshold concept, the fact that paradigms of
compassion will help even in trivial cases is compatible with imperfectly
virtuous people failing to meet that high standard.
Miller’s second response is more promising: that studies of the so-called
bystander effect show that many of us will not help even in serious cases if
surrounded by a crowd of people who are also not helping. And failures
to help in serious cases are arguably more virtue-undermining than failures to help in trivial ones. But even here, there is a problem. The studies
of the bystander effect cited by Miller are one-off studies. What they show
is that many people fail to exhibit compassion in certain serious circumstances. But they don’t show that such people continually, or regularly, fail
to show compassion in serious circumstances. Iterated empirical studies
would be necessary to show that. But given a threshold conception of virtue, one or two failures in compassion, even if they are relatively serious,
are plausibly compatible with the possession of imperfect compassion. So
we would need to know more about how often such bystander effects are
operative in the lives of real people to know if they lead to enough bad
behavior to disqualify someone from possessing (imperfect) compassion.
But the psychological studies on offer do not yet meet this evidential bar.
In fairness, Miller himself often notes that the study of character is still
in its infancy, and we should be carrying out more and better research
on it. That is certainly correct. Moreover, suppose I am right that more
of us may be (imperfectly) virtuous than Miller allows. One might then
argue quite plausibly that anyone who is imperfectly virtuous ought to
aim at becoming more virtuous than they currently are, and hence Miller’s
strategies for cultivating the virtues would still be relevant. Of course, the
moral importance or urgency of employing these strategies might seem
less if we were already (imperfectly) virtuous. But in any event, the existence of a somewhat larger class of imperfectly virtuous people need not
fatally undermine Miller’s call for most of us to improve our character.
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A second question I had for Miller concerns his argument for the claim
that most of us lack the vice of cruelty. It may well be true that most of us
lack that vice, but I am not sure it is true for the reasons Miller thinks. The
Milgram Experiment famously showed that ordinary people are disturbingly willing to seriously injure an innocent person simply because an
authority figure asks them to. Miller thinks the Milgram experiments are
evidence that most of us lack virtue. But Miller denies that the Milgram
Experiments are evidence that most of are cruelly vicious. In the first
place, most of those who were willing to injure an innocent person did
so reluctantly, and experienced pain while doing so. Moreover, when the
experiment was varied so as to allow them to determine how much harm
to do to others, most happily took the chance to do a minimal, rather than
maximal, amount of harm. Miller concludes that most of us are therefore
not viciously cruel.
Even setting aside concerns about whether one-off experiments can license conclusions about character, I had worries about the moral claims
underlying Miller’s analysis of these kinds of cases. Consider a nonlaboratory kind of case. Here’s one thing that sometimes happens in families: one spouse is a very bad parent indeed, bullying and perhaps even
abusing his or her children. The other spouse is fully aware of this behavior, finds it painful to observe and, were their spouse to stop bullying the
children, would find it a relief. But nonetheless, they do nothing to stop it
and, when pressed, make excuses for it. They are, in short, enablers of their
spouse’s bullying behavior. In evaluating such a case, it seems obvious that
the bullying spouse is vicious. And it is at least plausible that the bullying
spouse is worse than the enabling spouse. But what shall we say about the
enabling spouse? My own view is that, at least in certain cases, the enabling
spouse is also vicious, even if less vicious than the bullying spouse. While
the mere toleration of the bullying might be less bad than actively desiring
the bullying, it could still be bad enough to rise to the level of vice.
But why, then, aren’t the reluctant Milgram experimenters vicious (or at
least behaving viciously in this instance)? Like the enabling spouse, they
would rather that harm didn’t occur and are pained to see it occur. But
also like the enabling spouse, they are perfectly willing to let the harm go
on (indeed, they are causing the harm!) and make excuses for its continuation. True, they would be even more vicious (or at least behaving even
more viciously in this instance) if they heartily endorsed their harming behavior and sought out opportunities to increase it. But that doesn’t show
they are not at all vicious when they “merely” participate in it at someone
else’s direction.
Finally, let me raise a question concerning Miller’s claim that we can do
something to improve our characters. Miller is rightly cautious in his suggestions here; given the paucity of long-term studies of character development, he offers no guarantee that these strategies will work. But even so,
I did not quite understand why he was so optimistic about some of them.
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Consider, in particular, his suggestion that we might select our situations in order to improve our character. Here, he approvingly cites John
Doris’s famous example of being invited to a secluded dinner party with
a flirtatious colleague while one’s spouse is away. Obviously, going to the
dinner and trusting your virtue to rescue you from cheating is not the smart
thing to do; the smart thing is to decline the invitation (Lack of Character
[Cambridge University Press, 2002], 147). Miller agrees. And, of course, so
should we. Avoiding the dinner may well help us avoid acting badly.
But Miller is making the further claim—a claim for which Doris himself
was not arguing—that avoiding the dinner may also help us to become
better people. And it is not obvious to me how that is supposed to work.
The alcoholic who avoids bars is surely wise; he is almost just as surely still
an alcoholic. Merely avoiding the “near occasion of sin” hasn’t cured him
of the desire to drink alcohol. Likewise, the partnered person who avoids
candlelit dinners with colleagues is surely wise; but she is not thereby
made a more virtuous person—at least not if virtue is a disposition of the
heart, as Miller thinks that it is. Perhaps the hope is that simply avoiding
adultery eventually makes it less attractive. But it isn’t as if avoiding forbidden fruit always makes the fruit less attractive. Quite to the contrary.
So I think we need to hear more about how this strategy would work.
Of course, none of the three questions I have raised are intended as
decisive objections to Miller’s project; they are instead invitations to further elaboration. It is a mark of a good book to raise more questions than
it can itself answer. And this is a very good book indeed. A final note on
audience: while this book is not written for professional philosophers
or psychologists, it would nonetheless be appropriate for use in certain
academic contexts. My own university, for example, has recently begun
offering interdisciplinary seminars to first year students with the aim of
exemplifying how the methodologies typical of empirical science and ethical thought, for example, can fruitfully interact. The Character Gap could
serve as an ideal text for such a course.

God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil, by
Mark C. Murphy. Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 224. $70.00 (hardcover).
KYLA EBELS-DUGGAN, Northwestern University
In God’s Own Ethics, Mark Murphy argues that traditional formulations of
the problem of evil rely on unwarranted presumptions about the ethics of
the God whose existence they purport to disprove. The argument has two
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